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Introduction 
The  rise of the  new  classical macroeconomics,  with 
its  key  idea  that  systematic  monetary  policy  cannot 
influence  real  activity,  has  revived  interest  in  the 
so-called  classical neutrality  postulate.  That  postulate, 
of course,  holds  that  money-stock  changes  affect  only 
the  price  level  and  not  real  output  and  employment. 
My  concern  in  this  paper  is not  with  the  neutrality 
postulate  per  se but  rather  with  some  recent  claims 
made  about  the  original  classical  economists’  adher- 
ence  to  it. 
In particular,  I am  concerned  with  the  contention 
that  the  classicals-i.e.,  those  predominantly  British 
economists  who  wrote  during  the  period  1750-1870 
dating  roughly  from  the  publication  of David  Hume’s 
Essays  to  the  emergence  of  the  marginalist  revolu- 
tion  in the  writings  of William  Stanley  Jevons,  Carl 
Menger,  and Leon  Walras-denied  that  money-stock 
changes  had  output  and  employment  effects  even  in 
the  short  run.  Such  contentions  have  been  voiced 
most  recently  by  Lucas  Papademos  and  Franc0 
Modigliani  in their  essay  “The  Supply  of Money  and 
the  Control  of Nominal  Income”  in volume  1 of the 
prestigious  Handbook  of Monetary  Economics.  They 
state: 
The  role  of money  in classical  economics  is a simple  one, 
and  so  is  the  effect  of  a change  in  the  quantity  of  money 
on  aggregate  nominal  income.  According  to classical  theory 
all markets  for  goods,  including  the  market  for  labour  ser- 
vices,  clear  continuously,  with  relative  prices  adjusting 
flexibly  to ensure  the  attainment  of equilibrium.  Resources 
are fully utilized  and  thus  aggregate  employment  and  output 
are  always  at  the  “full-employment”  or  “natural”  levels 
determined  by  tastes,  productive  technology  and  endow- 
ments,  except  for  transitory  deviations  due  to  real 
disturbances. 
In  such  an  economy,  money  . . . does  not  influence  the 
determination  of  relative  prices,  real  interest  rates,  the 
equilibrium  quantities  of commodities,  and  thus  aggregate 
real  income.  Money  is  “neutral”,  a  “veil”  with  no  conse- 
quences  for  real  economic  magnitudes  .  .  .  (pp.  4056). 
Others  arguing  that  the  classicals  believed  that 
money  is always  neutral  with  respect  to  output  and 
employment  include  David  Glasner,  Arjo  Klamer, 
Kevin  Hoover,  and  Michael  Artis.  Glasner,  in  his 
1989  book  Free  Banking  and  Monetary  Refire, 
asserts  that  “in  the  economy  the  classical  theorists 
envisioned,  the  monetary  sector  could  not  .  .  . be 
a source  of instability.  A disturbance  could  only  arise 
in the  nonmonetary  or  real  sector  . . .” (p.  59).  Arjo 
Klamer  agrees.  In the  first  chapter  of his well-known 
1984  Conversations with  Economists, he  characterizes 
the  classical  view  by  means  of  a vertical  aggregate 
supply  schedule  drawn  at  the  full-capacity  level  of 
output  in  price-output  space.  The  vertical  supply 
curve  guarantees  that  any  money-induced  shift  in 
aggregate  demand  affects  only  the  price  level  but  not 
real  output.  Support  for  Klamer’s  interpretation 
comes  from  Kevin  Hoover  who,  in his  1988  Th  Nm 
CLassical  Mameconomics:  A Skeptical  Enquz’ry, writes: 
The  vertical  aggregate  supply  curve  provides  an  adequate 
capsulization  of the  classical  view.  . . . Changes  in the  level 
of  the  stock  of  money  would  change  the  general  level  of 
prices,  but,  because  money  was  thought  to  be  neutral  . . . 
relative  prices  and  the  levels  of  employment  and  output 
would  not  be  affected  (pp.  9-10). 
Likewise,  Michael  Artis,  in his  1984  Macrveconomics, 
explains: 
the  classical  model  guarantees  full employment  equilibrium, 
and  the  ‘neutrality  of money’,  i.e.  the  property  that  changes 
in  the  nominal  money  supply  do  not  affect  the  real  out- 
comes,  but  only  the  price  level  (p.  193). 
This  article  argues  (1) that  the  foregoing  interpreta- 
tions  are  wrong,  (2)  that  the  classicals  held  that 
money  affects  output  and  employment  certainly  in 
the  short  run  and  perhaps  to  some  extent  in the  long 
run  too,  (3) that  they  identified  at least  nine  reasons 
for  the  occurrence  of such  effects,  and  (4) that  their 
concern  with  money’s  impact  on  the  level  of  real 
activity  strongly  influenced  their  views  of  the 
desirability  or  undesirability  of monetary  expansion 
and  contraction.  In  short,  the  following  survey  of 
eleven  leading  classical monetary  theorists-including 
Thomas  Attwood,  Jeremy  Bentham,  David  Hume, 
Thomas  Robert  Malthus,  John  Ramsay  McCulloch, 
James  Mill, John  Stuart  Mill,  David  Ricardo,  Henry 
Thornton,  Robert  Torrens,  and  John  Wheatley- 
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money  is always  neutral  and that  continuous  market- 
clearing  and  perfect  wage-price  flexibility  prevail.  l 
In holding  that  money’s  short-run  impact  is predomi- 
nantly  on output  while  its long-run  impact  is chiefly 
on  prices,  the  classicals  adhered  to  much  the  same 
view  expressed  by  Milton  Friedman  in  his  1970 
Wincott  Memorial  lecture  on  The Counter-Revohdon 
in Monetav  Thory.  Wrote  Friedman:  “In  the  short 
run,  which  may  be  as  much  as  five  or  ten  years, 
monetary  changes  affect  primarily  output.  Over 
decades,  on  the  other  hand,  the  rate  of  monetary 
growth  affects  primarily  prices”  (pp.  23-24). 
The  article  proceeds  as follows:  First  it  itemizes 
the  particular  sources  or  causes  .of  nonneutrality 
specified  by  the  classicals.  Next  it  describes  what 
individual  classical writers  had to say about  each  item. 
Finally  it shows  how  classical  views  of nonneutrality 
continue  to  survive  in  twentieth-century  monetary 
thought.  The  central  message  is that  the  notion  of 
at  least  some  nonneutrality  is  part  of  an  enduring 
classical  monetary  tradition  and  that  theories  stress- 
ing  neutrality-always  are  a  departure  from  that 
tradition. 
Sources  of Nonneutrali& 
The  table  below  lists  the  causes  of nonneutrality 
specified  by  the  classicals.  A  glance  at  the  table 
shows  how  erroneous  is  the  notion  that  those 
economists  denied  that  money  affects  real  activity. 
For  example,  they  argued  that  real effects  could  stem 
1 On  these  points  see  O’Brien  (1975,  pp.  162-6.5) and  Niehans 
(1987)  both  of whom  stress  the  short-run  nonneutrality  of money 
in classical  thought.  See  also  Viner  (1937,  pp.  185-200)  for  an 
earlier  treatment  of  that  same  subject. 
from price  inertia which  caused  money-stock  changes 
to influence  output  before  fully affecting  prices.  They 
found  another  source  of nonneutrality  in the  lag  of 
nominal  wages  behind  rising  or  falling  prices.  This 
lag caused  real wages  and thus  real profits  to change, 
thereby  altering  incentives  for  employment  and 
production.  They  also  attributed  money’s  nonneu- 
trality to the ftity  of certain  nominal  contractual  costs 
whose  real  burden  rose  or  fell  with  deflation  or 
inflation. 
Inflation-induced  shifts of real income  from workers 
and  rentiers  to  producers  who  invest  in real  capital 
constituted  an additional  source  of nonneutrality.  So 
did  the  lag in nominal  interest  rates  behind  inflation 
which  caused  real  rates  to  change  thus  affecting 
business  borrowing,  capital  investment,  and  real  ac- 
tivity.  Nonneutrality  was  also  seen  to  stem  from 
desired  fixed  inventory-to-sales  ratios  that  trans- 
formed  money-induced  increases  in  sales  into  in- 
creased  production  for  inventory.  The  classicals 
likewise  traced  nonneutrality  to a confusion  between 
changes  in  general  and  relative  prices-this  confu- 
sion  causing  monetary  shocks  to be  misperceived  as 
real  ones  requiring  output  .adjustments. 
The  classicals  further  argued  that  money  affects 
output  by influencing  business  confidence.  They  also 
cited  the  boost  to  productivity  given  by  money- 
induced  increases  in  aggregate  demand  which,  by 
extending  the  scope  of  the  market  for  goods,  en- 
courages  specialization  and  division  of labor.  Some 
classicals  even  held  that  money’s  output  effects 
emanate  from  the-need  to  work  harder  to  maintain 
one’s  real  income  in  the  face  of  inflation. 
Rightly  or  wrongly,  the  classicals  appealed  to 
many  explanations  to account  for money’s  impact  on 
SOURCES  OF  NONNEUTRALITY 
Cause(s) Money to affect 
Source  real activity through: 
Sticky  prices  real  expenditure 
Sticky  nominal  wages  real  wages 
Fixed  nominal  costs  real  cost  burdens 
Fixed  nominal  income  of 
certain  groups  (“forced  saving”)  distributive  shares  and  capital  formation 
Sticky  nominal  interest  rates  real  interest  rates 
Fixed  inventory-to-sales  ratios  inventory  investment 
General  price-relative  price  confusion  misperceived  price  signals 
State  of  business  confidence  changes  in  confidence 
Market-size  limitation  to  division  of  labor  labor  productivity 
Efforts  to  maintain  real  income  labor-force  participation  rate 
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Attwood,  McCulloch 
Bentham,  Thornton,  Malthus, 
Ricardo,  McCulloch 
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Thornton 
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Attwood,  McCulloch,  Torrens 
Attwood,  Malthus,  Torrens 
Torrens output  and  employment.  One  of the  first  to  do  so 
was  David  Hume,  who  invoked  the  notion  of price 
inertia. 
David  Hume  and the Lag  of Prices 
Behind Money 
The  classical theory  of nonneutrality,  though  partly 
rooted  in the writings  of Richard  Cantillon,  John  Law, 
and  William  Potter,  owes  its greatest  debt  to David 
Hume.  In  his  1752  essays  “Of  Money”  and  “Of 
Interest,”  Hume  argued  that  while  a fixed  absolute 
quantity  of money  is of no consequence  for the  level 
of output  and  employment,  c/langes in  the  quantity 
of  money  have  a very  real  significance. 
Accordingly  we  find,  that,  in  every  kingdom  into  which 
money  begins  to flow  in greater  abundance  than  formerly, 
every  thing  takes  a new  face:  labour  and  industry  gain  life; 
the  merchant  becomes  more  enterprising,  the  manufacturer 
more  diligent  and  skilful,  and  even  the  farmer  follows  his 
plough  with  greater  alacrity  and  attention  (p.  37). 
Hume  attributes  these  nonneutralities  to  the  lag 
of prices  behind  money.  This  lag,  he  says,  causes 
money-induced  changes  in nominal  spending  to  be 
divided  in  favor  of  output  before  being  fully  ab- 
sorbed  by  prices.  In  his  words: 
To  account,  then,  for this  phenomenon,  we  must  consider, 
that  though  the  high  price  of commodities  be  a necessary 
consequence  of the  encrease  of gold and  silver,  yet  it follows 
not  immediately  upon  that  encrease;  but  some  time  is 
required  before  the  money  circulates  through  the  whole 
state,  and  makes  its  effect  be  felt  on  all ranks  of people. 
At  first,  no  alteration  is  perceived;  by  degrees  the  price 
rises,  first  of  one  commodity,  then  of  another;  till  the 
whole  at last  reaches  a just  proportion  with  the  new  quan- 
tity  of  specie  which  is  in  the  kingdom.  In  my  opinion,  it 
is  only  in  this  interval  or  intermediate  situation,  between 
the  acquisition  of  money  and  rise  of  prices,  that  the  en- 
creasing  quantity  of gold  and  silver  is favourable  to industry 
(pp.  37-38). 
Hume  ascribes  the  price  lag to  the  availability  of 
idle  labor  willing  to  work  at  existing  wages.  Prices 
and  wages  rise  only  after  all  hands  become  fully 
employed. 
When  any quantity  of money  is imported  into  a nation,  it is 
not  at  first  dispersed  into  many  hands,  but  is  confined  to 
the  coffers  of  a  few  persons,  who  immediately  seek  to 
employ  it to  advantage.  .  .  . They  are  thereby  enabled  to 
employ  more  workmen  than  formerly,  who  never  dream  of 
demanding  higher  wages,  but  are glad  of employment  from 
such  good  paymasters.  If  workmen  become  scarce,  the 
manufacturer  gives  higher  wages,  but  at  first  requires  an 
encrease  of labour;  and  this  is willingly  submitted  to by the 
artisan,  who  can  now  eat  and  drink  better,  to  compensate 
his  additional  toil  and  fatigue.  He  carries  his  money  to 
market,  where  he  finds  every  thing  at  the  same  price  as 
formerly,  but  returns  with  greater  quantity  and  of  better 
kinds,  for the  use  of his  family.  . .  . It  is easy  to  trace  the 
money  in  its  progress  through  the  whole  commonwealth; 
where  we  shall  find,  that  it must  first  quicken  the  diligence 
of every  individual,  before  it  encrease  the  price  of  labour 
(P.  3% 
David  Hume 
(1711-1776) 
Hume  next  distinguishes  between  temporary  and 
permanent  nonneutrality.  Temporary  nonneutrality 
stems  from  one-time  changes  in  the  money  stock, 
changes  to  which  prices  eventually  adjust.  By con- 
trast,  permanent  nonneutrality  stems  from  a  con- 
tinuous  succession  of such  changes  to  which  prices 
never  fully  catch  up. 
As an example  of temporary  nonneutrality,  Hume 
considers  the  transitory  stimulus  to  output  exerted 
by  a one-time  rise  in the  money  stock.  Noting  that 
the  stimulus  vanishes  once  prices  adjust  to  the 
augmented  quantity  of  money,  he  concludes  that 
Money,  however  plentiful,  has  no other  effect,  iffixe,  than 
to  raise  the  price  of  labour.  .  .  .  and  .  .  .  commodities. 
. . . In the  progress  towards  these  changes,  the  augmenta- 
tion may have  some  influence,  by exciting  industry;  but  after 
the  prices  are  settled,  suitably  to  the  new  abundance  of 
gold  and  silver,  it has  no  manner  of influence  (pp.  47-48). 
Hume  points  out  that  this  same  process  works  in 
reverse,  a one-time  contraction  in the  money  stock 
first  depressing  output  and  employment  before  it 
lowers  prices. 
A nation,  whose  money  decreases,  is actually,  at that  time, 
weaker  and  more  miserable  than  another  nation,  which 
possesses  no  more  money,  but  is on  the  encreasing  hand. 
This  will  be  easily  accounted  for,  if we  consider,  that  the 
alterations  in  the  quantity  of money  .  .  . are  not  immedi- 
ately attended  with  proportionable  alterations  in the  price  of 
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be  adjusted  to  their  new  situation;  and  this  interval  is  as 
pernicious  to industry,  when  gold and  silver are diminishing, 
as  it  is  advantageous  when  these  metals  are  encreasing 
(P.  40). 
To  Hume,  monetary  contraction  had  devastating 
real  effects: 
The  workman  has  not  the  same  employment  from  the 
manufacturer  and  merchant;  though  he pays  the  same  price 
for everything  in the  market.  The  farmer  cannot  dispose  of 
his  corn  and  cattle;  though  he  must  pay  the  same  rent  to 
his  landlord.  The  poverty,  and  beggary,  and  sloth,  which 
must  ensue,  are  easily  foreseen  (p.  40). 
Here  is the  source  of the  classicals’ emphasis  on the 
evils  of  monetary  contraction. 
As for permanent  nonneutrality  associated  with sus- 
tained  rates  of  monetary  change,  Hume  argued  as 
follows:  Continuous  money  growth  combines  with 
sluggish  price  adjustment  to  keep  money  forever 
marching  a  step  ahead  of  prices,  perpetually 
frustrating  the  latter’s  attempts  to catch  up.  The  gap 
between  money  and prices  persists  indefinitely,  thus 
producing  a permanent  change  in  the  level  of  real 
activity.  Hume’s  advice  to the  policymakers:  exploit 
such nonneutrality  via gradual  enduring  monetary  ex- 
pansion.  For  while 
it  is  of  no  manner  of  consequence,  with  regard  to  the 
domestic  happiness  of  a  state,  whether  money  be  in  a 
greater  or less quantity,  [t]he  good  policy  of the  magistrate 
consists  only  in  keeping  it,  if  possible,  still  encreasing; 
because,  by  that  means,  he  keeps  alive  a spirit  of industry 
in the  nation,  and  encreases  the  stock  of labour,  in which 
consists  all  real  power  and  riches  (pp.  39-40). 
Hume’s  theory  of  the  inflation  mechanism  was 
inherited  by the  other  classical economists.  Of these, 
only James  Mill, David  Ricardo,  and John  Wheatley 
rejected  it in its entirety.  Ricardo,  whose  skepticism 
of monetary  policy’s  ability  to influence  real  activity 
rivals  that  of  modern  new  classicals,  simply  called 
Hume’s  theory  “an erroneous  view”  (fi&  V, 524) 
and  remarked  that  “money  cannot  call forth  goods” 
(K&s,  III,  301).  Mill  likewise  dismissed  Hume’s 
mechanism  with  the  assertion  that  money  cannot 
exert  even  the  briefest  stimulus  to output  since prices 
instantly  rise  to  absorb  all the  stimulus.z  Wheatley 
2 Mill  wrote:  ‘The  man  who  goes  first  to  market  with  the 
augmented  quantity  of money,  either  raises  the price  of the  com- 
modities  which  he  purchases,  or  he  does  not  raise  it. 
If he  does  not  raise  it,  he  gives  no  additional  encouragement 
to production.  The  supposition,  therefore,  must  be that  he does 
raise prices.  But exactly  in proportion  as he raises prices,  he sinks 
the  value  of money.  He  therefore  gives  no additional  encourage- 
ment  to production”  (1821,  p.  123,  as quoted  in Cony,  1962, 
p.  40). 
was  equally  adamant,  holding  that  “an  increase  of 
money  has  no  other  effect  than  to  cause  its  own 
depression”  in  value  (1803,  p.  17,  as  quoted  in 
Fetter  1942,  p.  370). 
True,  Ricardo  and  Wheatley  sometimes  ex- 
pressed  concern  with  the  evils of monetary  contrac- 
tion.  But the  evils they  had in mind  consisted  almost 
solely  of the  arbitrary  redistributive  effects  of defla- 
tion.  Virtually  no output  or employment  effects  were 
envisioned.3  Such  views,  however,  were  exceptions 
and not  at all representative  of the  dominant  classical 
position.  Starting  with  Hume,  most  classicals  ac- 
cepted  the  view  that  money  matters  for real  output 
and  employment,  temporarily  if not  permanently. 
Lag  of Wages  Behind Prices 
Hume  blamed  nonneutrality  on  sluggish  price 
adjustment.  The  next  source  of nonneutrality  recog- 
nized  by the  classicals  was the  lag of nominal  wages 
behind  prices. The  classic&  explained  how monetary 
expansion  and  the  resulting  rise  of  prices  would, 
because  of the  stickiness  of wages  relative  to prices, 
lower  real wages,  raise real profits,  and thereby  spur 
J On  this  point  see  Fetter  (1942,  pp.  369-71)  who  effectively 
refutes  Viner’s  contention  that  Wheatley  was  concerned  with 
the  output  effects  of contraction.  Also note  that  Ricardo’s  belief 
in  money’s  neutrality  extended  only  to  the  leeeel, not  the  com- 
position.  of outout.  He  (W&z  I,  208-9)  thouaht  that,  because 
ihe  structure  of excise  taxes  was fixed  in’nomi&l  terms,  money- 
and  hence  price-level  changes  could,  via their  effect  on the  real 
tax  structure,  alter  profit  rates  and  thus  incentives  to  produce 
in different  sectors  of the economy.  The  result would  be a change 
in the  composition,  though  not  the  aggregate  level,  of output. 
David  Ricardo  \  \ 
(1772-1823) 
,\I 
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nominal  wages  behind  prices  would  cause  monetary 
contraction  and  the  ensuing  price  deflation  to  raise 
real wages,  lower  real profits,  and thereby  discourage 
production  and  employment. 
Henry  Thornton  was  among  the  first  to expound 
these  points.  He  noted  that  declines  in the  stock  of 
money  would  have  no  employment  effect  if wages 
fell  as  fast  as prices.  He  then  observed  that  wages 
in  fact  were  downwardly  inflexible  in  response  to 
price  falls, particularly  temporary  or unexpected  ones. 
For  that  reason  he  thought  monetary  contraction 
would  depress  real activity.  In his  180’2 Paper Cmdit 
he  wrote: 
It  is true,  that  if we  could  suppose  the  diminution  of bank 
paper  to  produce  permanently  a diminution  in the  value  of 
all articles  whatsoever  and  a diminution  .  . . in the  rate  of 
wages  also,  the  encouragement  to future manufactures  would 
be  the  same,  though  there  would  be  a loss  on  the  stock  in 
hand.  The  tendency,  however,  of a very  great  and  sudden 
reduction  of the  accustomed  number  of bank  notes,  is  to 
create  an unusu&  and  remporary  distress,  and  a fall of price 
arising  from  that  distress.  But a fall arising  from  temporary 
distress,  will  be  attended  probably  with  no  correspondent 
fall in the  rate  of wages;  for the  fall of price,  and  the  distress, 
will be  understood  to be  temporary,  and  the  rate  of wages, 
we  know,  is not  so variable  as the  price  of goods.  There  is 
reason,  therefore,  to fear that  the  unnatural  and extraordinary 
low price  arising  from  the  sort  of distress  of which  we  now 
speak,  would  occasion  much  discouragement  of the  fabri- 
cation  of  manufactures  (pp.  118-19). 
Of  Thornton’s  analysis  two  points  are  especially 
noteworthy.  First,  he  attributes  money-wage 
stickiness  to  the  fact  that  wages  are  established  on 
the  basis  of the  expected  long-run  equilibrium  price 
level  which  is  much  less  volatile  than  temporary 
prices.  In a long  footnote  attached  to  the  preceding 
passage  he  explains  that  the  equilibrium  price  level 
in an  open  economy  operating  under  the  gold  stan- 
dard  is  determined  on  purchasing-power-parity 
grounds  by  the  given  world  gold  price  of  goods. 
Second,  he  blames  economic  distress  on  unexpected 
contractions  of  the  money  stock.  In  so  doing,  he 
anticipates  today’s  new  classicals  who  argue  that  only 
unanticipated  money  matters  for  real  variables. 
To  avoid  deflation  and  its adverse  effects,  Thorn- 
ton  recommended  preventing  gold  drains- 
particularly  those  arising from bank  panics  and/or  real 
shocks  to the  balance  of payments-from  shrinking 
the  money  supply.  The  Bank  of  England  should 
offset or sterilize  such  drains  with  compensating  note 
issues,  thus  forestalling  monetary  contraction  and  its 
adverse  consequences.  He  was  even  willing  to  risk 
temporary  suspension  of the gold standard  rather  than 
Henry  Thornton 
(1760-1815) 
to let  specie  drains  precipitate  declines  in the  quan- 
tity  of money.  To  him,  suspension  was  preferable 
to  contraction  and  the  depression  it  would  bring. 
He  was  equally  opposed  to  inflation  although  he 
admitted  that  it could  stimulate  activity  through  the 
wage  lag.  Said  he: 
. . . additional  industry  will be one  effect  of an extraordinary 
emission  of paper,  a rise  in the  cost  [i.e.,  price]  of articles 
will  be  another. 
Probably  no  small  part  of that  industry  which  is excited 
by  new  paper  is produced  through  the  very  means  of the 
enhancement  of  the  cost  of  commodities  (p.  237). 
Ricardo  disagreed  with  Thornton.  He  did  so  on 
the  grounds  that  wage  flexibility  rendered  the  lag too 
short  for  money  to  have  more  than  a  negligible 
impact  on output.  But other  classicals  concurred  with 
Thornton.  Among  them  was  Robert  Torrens  who 
stressed  the  stimulus  to  profit  and  production 
emanating  from  sticky  wages.  When  the  Political 
Economy  Club  met  in  December  1830  to  discuss 
Hume’s  theory  of beneficial  inflation,  Torrens  was 
in attendance  to  state  his  views.  According  to J.  L. 
Mallet’s  account  of  the  proceedings: 
Torrens  .  . . looks  chiefly  to  profits  as  the  great  means  of 
increasing  general  wealth,  and  as wages  are fixed  from  time 
to  time  .  .  . and  do  not  rise,  perhaps  for  a long  time  after 
the  value  of  money  has  fallen,  the  Capitalist  pays  in  fact 
for  long  periods,  lower  real  wages,  and  is  a great  gainer. 
All employers  of Capital  borrowed  are likewise  benefitted- 
paying  less  interest.  There  is a greater  stimulus  to produc- 
tion  (Political  Economy  Club,  1921,  p.  219,  as  quoted  in 
Cony,  1962,  p.  58). 
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Closely  associated  with  sticky  wages  was  another 
source  of nonneutrality,  namely  the  existence  of con- 
tractually  fixed  costs,  notably  rents,  taxes,  and  debt- 
service  charges.  Being  fixed  in nominal  terms,  these 
costs,  the classicals explained,  did not rise with prices, 
at  least  not  in  the  short  run.  Consequently  when 
prices  rose  due  to  monetary  expansion  the  real 
burden  of fixed  costs  fell. The  corresponding  rise  in 
profits  would  spur  output  and  employment.  Con- 
versely,  monetary  contraction  and  price  deflation 
would,  by  raising  the  real  burden  of fixed  nominal 
charges,  discourage  real  activity. 
\  (1789:1864) 
Of  the  classical  writers,  J.  R.  McCulloch  and 
Thomas  Attwood  stressed  this  particular  source  of 
nonneutrality.  Thus  O’Brien  (1970),  in his definitive 
study  of McCulloch,  writes  that  the  latter  saw  the 
benefits  of  monetary  inflation 
as being  in reducing  the  weight  of fKed  burdens-rents  and 
taxes-as  they  remained  constant  in money  terms  while  the 
prices  of final  products  increased,  hence  increasing  profit 
margins.  Increased  profit  stimulated  production,  employ- 
ment,  and  wages.  Precisely  the  opposite  effect  arose  from 
reducing  the  quantity  of  money  (pp.  160-61). 
Thomas  Attwood  too  held  that  rising  prices  spur 
activity  by  reducing  the  real  burden  of  fixed  costs 
or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  by  increasing  the  gap 
between  prices  and  these  costs.  “There  is,”  he 
claimed,  “no  difficulty  in  employing  and  maintain- 
ing  labourers,  so  long  as the  prices  of the  products 
.  .  .  are  kept  above  the range of the fixed  charges and 
moniedmpenses”  (1826,  p.  42,  italics  in original).  To 
him  the  extra  profits  arising  from  a widening  of the 
gap  between  prices  and  fixed  costs  constituted  the 
key  to money’s  stimulus.  “Prosperity,”  he wrote,  has 
occurred  whenever  the  government  has 
filled  the  Country  with  what  is called  Money; and  thisp/m@ 
of Money has  necessarily  produced  a  general  elevation  of 
prices;  and  this  general  elevation  of prices  has  necessarily 
produced  a general  increase  ofpru$t  in all occupations;  and 
this  general  increase  of pm@  has,  as  a matter  of  course, 
given  activity  to every  trade  in the  kingdom;  and  whilst  the 
workmen,  in one  branch  of trade,  areprvdubzg  one  set  of 
articles,  they  are  inevitably  consuming an  equal  amount  of 
all other  articles.  This  is  the  pmptity  of &  Country,  and 
there  is no  other  prosperity  which  ever  has  been  enjoyed, 
or ever  can be enjoyed  (1826,  pp.  11-12,  italics  in original). 
Again, 
The.  . . prosperity  of the  Country  is indeed  to be attributed 
to  one  cause  only,  and  that  cause  is the  general  increase  of 
the  Circulating  Medium  (1826,  p.  12). 
By contrast,  monetary  contraction  and  deflation, 
he  held,  had  the  opposite  effect.  For  when  “paper 
money is withdrawn”  and  “the  prices  of commodities 
are  suffered  to  fall  .  .  . within  the  level  of thefied 
charges and  expences . .  . the  industry  of the  country 
dies”  (1826,  p.  42,  italics  in  original).  It  does  so 
because  “all the  monied  incumbrances,”  being  fixed 
in nominal  terms,  “become  encreased  in real burthen, 
and operate  in arresting  all the means  and the  motives 
which  conduce  to the  employment  of labour,  and  to 
the  production  of  national  wealth”  (1819,  p.  42). 
Attwood  concludes: 
When  a  [price]  fall  .  .  .  takes  place  .  .  .  first  upon  one 
article  and  then  upon  another,  without  any  correspondent 
fall taking  place  upon  debts  and  obligations,  it has  the  effect 
of destroying  all confidence  in property,  and  all inducements 
to  its  production,  or to  the  employment  of laborers  in any 
way  (1817,  pp.  78-79,  as  quoted  in Viner,  1937,  p.  186). 
In  short,  owing  to  rigid  cost  elements,  deflation 
leads  to  depression  that  brings  suffering  to  the 
unemployed  and  distress  to  producers.  It therefore 
follows,  said  Attwood,  that 
it  is  the  deficiency  of  money,  and  not  its  excess,  which 
ought  most  to be  guarded  against,  which  produces  want  of 
employment,  poverty,  misery,  and  discontent  in  nations 
(1843,  p.  18). 
To  prevent  such  disastrous  monetary  shortage  he 
recommended  that  the  Bank  of  England 
be obligated  or otherwise  be induced,  to encrease  the  circu- 
lation  of  their  notes  as  far  as  the  national  interests  may 
require,  that  is to say,  until  all the  labourers  in the  kingdom 
are again  in full employment  at ample  wages  (18 19, p.  44). 
To  Attwood,  full employment  was  the  overriding 
policy  goal  and  price  increases  the  essential  means 
of  attaining  it.  Said  he: 
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the  Kingdom  are  out  of employment,  supposing  such  defi- 
ciency  of employment  not  to be  local but  general,  I should 
think  it the  duty,  and certainly  the  interest,  of Government, 
to  continue  the  depreciation  of  the  currency  until  full 
employment  is  obtained  and  general  prosperity  (1832, 
p.  467,  quoted  in  Fetter,  1964,  p.  xxii). 
Accordingly,  “the  great  object  of currency  legislation 
should  therefore  be  to  secure  and  promote  this 
gradual  depreciation”  (1817a,  p.  lOln,  quoted  in 
Checkland,  1948,  p.  8).  To  this  end  he  urged  the 
government  to 
Restore  the  depreciated  state  of  the  currency,  and  you 
restore  the  reward  of industry,  you restore  confidence,  you 
restore  consumption,  you restore  every  thing that constitutes 
the  commercial  prosperity  of the  nation  (1816,  p.  66). 
Attwood’s  inflationary  policy  views  were  too 
extreme  even  for other  classical believers  in the  non- 
neutrality  of money.  John  Stuart  Mill (1833),  for one, 
opposed  Attwood’s  inflationism  on  the  ground  that 
it only  works  by tricking  or deluding  producers  into 
thinking  that  nominal  price  changes  are real and thus 
constitutes  a deceitful  and immoral  way  to stimulate 
activity.  Mill  did  not,  however,  dispute  Attwood’s 
contention  that  inflation  could  raise profits  by reduc- 
ing  the  real  burden  of  fixed  costs.  This  item  had 
become  a standard  element  of the  classicals’  list of 
sources  of  nonneutrality. 
Forced  Saving 
The  classicals  explained  the  fourth  source  of 
money’s  nonneutrality  by means  of their&rce&z&zg 
doctrine.4 The  doctrine  holds  that  monetary  inflation 
stimulates  capital  formation  and  potential  output 
by  shifting  real  income  from  wage  earners  and fixed 
income  recipients  having  high  propensities  to  con- 
sume  to capitalist  entrepreneurs  having  high propen- 
sities  to  invest. 
The  doctrine  originates with Jeremy  Bentham  who, 
assuming  as  he  did  continuous  full  employment, 
used  it  to  argue  that  a  monetary  stimulus  must 
operate  through  capital formation  rather  than through 
the  activation  of idle  hands,  as Hume  had  claimed. 
In  his  1804  manuscript  “Institute  of  Political 
Economy,”  the  relevant  parts  of which  were  com- 
pleted  as  early  as  1800  or  1801,  Bentham  wrote: 
All  hands  being  employed,  and  employed  in  the  most 
advantageous  manner,  .  .  . the  effect  of every  increase  of 
money  . .  . is to  impose  an  unprofitable  income tax  on  the 
income  of  all fixed  incomists. 
If.  .  .  the  additional  money  have  come  into  hands  by 
which  it  has  been  employed  in  the  shape  of  capital,  the 
4 On  the classicals’ forced-saving  doctrine  see  Hayek  (1932)  and 
Hudson  (1965). 
\  Jeremy Bentham 
(1748-1832) 
suffering  by  the  income  tax  is  partly  reduced  and  partly 
compensated.  It is reduced  by  the  mass  of things  vendible 
produced  by  means  of  it.  .  .  .  It  is  in  a  certain  degree, 
though  in a very  inadequate  degree,  compensated  for by the 
same  means;  viz. by the  amount  of the  addition  made  to the 
quantity  of sensible  wealth-of  wealth  possessing  a value  in 
the  way  of use.  Here  .  .  .  in  the  .  .  .  case  of forced  fru- 
gality,  national  wealth  is increased  at the  expense  of national 
comfort  and  national  justice  (as  quoted  in  Hayek  1932, 
p.  125). 
Henry  Thornton  extended  the  doctrine  when  he 
argued  that,  owing to the  lag of wages  behind  prices, 
forced  saving  could  be extracted  from  wage-earners 
as well  as from  Bentham’s  fixed-income  recipients. 
As  he  put  it  in  his  Paper  Crediit: 
Provided  we assume  an excessive  issue  of paper  to  lift up, 
as it may  for a time,  the  cost  [i.e.,  price]  of goods  though 
not  the  price  of labour,  some  augmentation  of stock  will be 
the  consequence;  for the  labourer  . . . may  be forced  by his 
necessity  to consume  fewer  articles,  though  he may exercise 
the  same  industry.  But this  saving,  as well as any additional 
one which  may arise from a similar defalcation  of the revenue 
of  the  unproductive  members  of  the  society,  will  be  at- 
tended  with  a proportionate  hardship  and injustice  (p. 239). 
Oding  to these  forced-saving  effects,  Thornton  con- 
cludes  that  “paper  possesses  the  faculty  of enlarging 
the  quantity  of commodities  by  giving  life to  some 
new  industry”  (p.  239). 
T.  R.  Malthus  further  elaborated  the  doctrine  in 
his  18 11 Edinbu&  Review  article  on “Depreciation 
of Paper  Currency.”  He  held  that  forced  saving  was 
so potentially  powerful  in its  effects  on  production 
that  output  could  rise  equiproportionally  with  the 
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the  most  complete  description  of the  forced-saving 
mechanism  in the  classical literature,  Malthus’s  state- 
ment  warrants  quotation  in  some  detail.  He  starts 
by  linking  the  money  stock  and  its  distribution  to 
capital  formation  and  real  output. 
If  such  a  distribution  of  the  circulating  medium  were  to 
take  place,  as to throw  the  command  of the  produce  of the 
country  chiefly  into  the  hands  of  the  productive  classes 
. . . the  proportion  between  capital  and  revenue  would  be 
greatly  altered  to  the  advantage  of capital;  and  in  a  short 
time,  the produce  of the country  would  be greatly augmented 
(P.  96). 
/ 
Thomas  Robert Malthus 
(1766-1834) 
The  key  points,  Malthus  declares,  are  (1)  that 
new  money  accrues  to  capitalists  to  raise  the  share 
of  national  income  devoted  to  investment,  and 
(2) that  the  corresponding  required  decrease  in con- 
sumption  is  forced  upon  wage  earners  and  fixed- 
income  groups  by  the  price  rise  caused  by  the 
monetary  expansion.  Thus 
A  fresh  issue  of notes  comes.  .  .  . into  the  market,  as  so 
much  additional  capital,  to  purchase  what  is necessary  for 
the  conduct  of the  concern.  But  before  the  produce  of the 
country  has  been  increased,  it is impossible  for one  person 
to have  more  of it,  without  diminishing  the  shares  of some 
others.  This  diminution  is  effected  by  the  rise  of prices, 
occasioned  by the  competition  of the  new  notes,  which  puts 
it  out  of the  power  of those  who  are  only  buyers,  and  not 
sellers,  to purchase  as much  of the  annual  produce  as before 
(P.  96). 
From  his  analysis,  Malthus  concludes  that 
On  every  fresh  issue  of notes,  not  only  is the  quantity  of 
the  circulating  medium  increased,  but  the  distribution  of the 
whole  mass  is  altered.  A  larger  proportion  falls  into  the 
hands  of those  who  consume  and  produce,  and  a smaller 
proportion  into  the  hands  of those  who  only consume.  And 
as we  have  always  considered  capital  as that  portion  of the 
national  accumulations  and  annual  produce,  which  is at the 
command  of those  who  mean  to  employ  it with  a view  to 
reproduction,  we  are  bound  to  acknowledge,  that  an  in- 
creased  issue  of notes  tends  to increase  the  national  capital, 
and by an almost,  though  not  strictly necessary  consequence, 
to  lower  the  rate  of  interest  (pp.  96-97). 
These  effects,  Malthus  said,  may  explain  why “a rise 
of  prices  is  generally  found  conjoined  with  public 
prosperity;  and  a fall of prices  with  national  decline” 
(P.  97). 
Finally,  Malthus  notes  that  while  forced  saving 
necessarily  operates  through  rising  prices,  the  rise 
may  be  temporary.  For 
it frequently  happens,  we  conceive,  that  . . . the  increased 
command  of  the  produce  transferred  to  the  industrious 
classes  by  the  increase  of prices,  gives  such  a stimulus  to 
the  productive  powers  of the  country,  that,  in a short  time, 
the  balance  between  commodities  and  currency  is restored, 
by the  great  multiplication  of the  former,-and  prices  return 
to  their  former  level  (pp.  97-98). 
In terms  of the  equation  of exchange  MV = PQ,  with 
velocity  V constant,  output  Q rises  to match  the  in- 
crease  in money  M  leaving  the  equilibrium  level  of 
prices  P  unchanged. 
Ricardo  did  not  share  Malthus’s  opinion  of  the 
productive  power  of forced  saving.  Though  giving 
formal  recognition  to  the  doctrine,  he  denied  its 
empirical  importance.  Thus  he  denied  that  redistri- 
bution  from  fixed-income  receivers  to  capitalists 
could  produce  accumulation  since  both  groups,  he 
believed,  possessed  identical  propensities  to save  and 
invest.  In this  case,  he  said,  “there  is a mere  transfer 
of property,  but  no  creation”  of capital  (WbrRs, VI, 
16).  And  while  admitting  the  theoretical  possibility 
that  monetary  expansion  might  extract  forced  sav- 
ing  from  wage-earners  via  the  lag  of wages  behind 
prices,  he  contended  that  wage  flexibility  in  fact 
renders  the  lag  too  short  and  the  resulting  capital 
formation  and  output  expansion  too  trivial  to 
matter.  Said  he: 
There  appears  to  me  only  one  way  in  which  any  addition 
would  be  made  to  the  Capital  of a country  in consequence 
of an addition  of money;  it would  be  this.  Till  the  wages  of 
labour  had  found  their  new  level,  with  the  altered  value  of 
money,-the  situation  of the  labourer  would  be  relatively 
worse;  he  would  produce  more  relatively  to  that  which  he 
consumed,  or  rather  would  be  obliged  to  consume  less. 
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ers as he would  receive  an additional  price for his commodi- 
ties;  he  might  therefore  add  to  his  real  capital  till the  rise 
in the  wages  of labour  placed  him  in his proper  sphere.  In 
this  interval  some  mjhg  addition would  have  been  made 
to the Capital  of the community  (W?,  VI,  16-17, emphasis 
added). 
Likewise: 
There  is but  one  way  in which  an  increase  of money  .  .  . 
can  augment  riches,  viz  at  the  expence  of  the  wages  of 
labour;  till the  wages  of labour  have  found  their  level  with 
the  increased  prices  .  .  . there  will be  so  much  additional 
revenue  to  the  manufacturer  . . . so that  the  real  riches  of 
the  country  will  be  somewhat  augmented.  A  productive 
labourer  will  produce  something  more  than  before  rela- 
tively  to  his consumption,  but this can be only of momentary 
duration (WorRs, III,  318-19,  emphasis  added). 
In  sum,  Ricardo,  unlike  the  other  classicals,  was 
extremely  skeptical  of  the  forced-saving  idea. 
Although  the  above  economists  disputed  the  size 
of  forced  saving’s  effects,  none  disputed  the 
distributive  injustice  involved.  All saw forced  saving 
as  an  immoral  and  deceitful  means  of  stimulating 
accumulation  and on that  ground  condemned  its use. 
Not  so  J.  R.  McCulloch,  however.  He  praised 
forced  saving and its inflationary  effects  and rejected 
any  considerations  of injustice.  He  readily  acknowl- 
edged  that  inflation shifts real purchasing  power  from 
fixed-income  consumers  to  capitalist  investors.  But 
unlike  the  others,  he  lauded  such  redistribution  on 
the  grounds  that  the  gainers  exceeded  the  losers. 
Besides entrepreneurs,  the gainers included  the whole 
community  which  benefited  from  increased  output, 
employment,  and capital  formation.  The  losers were 
confined  to  a small group  of rentiers  and  annuitants 
but  excluded  wage-earners  since  wages,  he  felt, 
tended  to  rise  with  prices.  The  losers’  suffering  he 
thought  a small price  to pay  for the  general  benefits 
of inflation.5 Thus,  at the  December  3,  1830  meeting 
of  the  Political  Economy  Club,  he  callously  dis- 
missed  Thomas  Tooke’s  solicitude  for fixed-income 
recipients.  According  to  J.  L.  Mallet’s  Diaries: 
McCulloch  in his sarcastic  and  cynical  manner  derided  Mr. 
Tooke’s  concern  for  old  gentlemen  and  ladies,  dowagers, 
spinsters  and  land  holders.  He  cared  not  what  became  of 
5 Torrens  in  his  18 12 Erray on Money  and PaDer Chzn~  took 
much  the  same  position.  Hk  wrote  that  fiied:income  receivers 
constitute  “so small  a proportion  to the  whole  community,  that 
any  inconvenience  they  may  suffer,  from  a fall in the  value  of 
money,  sinks  into  insignificance,  nay  entirely  vanishes,  when 
comoared  with  the  universal  ooulence.  the  general  diffusion  of 
happiness  arising from augmented  trade;  and &e  rise in the wages 
of  labour,  which  the  increased  quantity  of  money  is  instru- 
mental  in producing”  (pp.  40-41,  as quoted  in Robbins,  1958, 
p.  76). 
them,  and  whether  they  were  driven  from  the  parlour  to 
the  garret,  provided  the  producers-the  productive  and 
industrious  classes-were  benefited,  which  he had  no doubt 
they  were  by  a gradual  depreciation  in the  value  of money 
(Political  Economy  Club,  1921,  p.  219,  as  quoted  in 
O’Brien,  1970,  p.  166). 
Although  he  extolled  inflation,  McCulloch’s  main 
concern  was with  the  evils  of deflation.  In this  con- 
nection  he argued  that  any  ill effects  of paper  money 
expansion  came  not  from  inflation  per  se but  from 
the  eventual  need  to contract  to protect  the  nation’s 
gold reserve.  He  feared  that  the  damage  wreaked  by 
the resulting  deflation would far exceed  the gains from 
the  preceding  inflation.  As proof,  he  noted  that  the 
prosperity  associated  with  inflation  during  the 
Napoleonic  Wars was more  than  offset by the distress 
that accompanied  the deflation in the immediate  post- 
war period.  To  him,  avoiding  monetary  contraction 
was far more  important  than  promoting  monetary  ex- 
pansion.  His  emphasis  on  the  damage  of  deflation 
was typical  of classical believers  in the  short-run  non- 
neutrality  of  money. 
Confusion  of Monetary  for Real  Shocks 
The  classicals  traced  a fifth source  of nonneutral- 
ity to a confusion  between  general  and relative  prices. 
They  explained  that  money  has real effects  because 
changes  in  its  quantity  cause  general  price  move- 
ments  which producers  mistake  for real relative  price 
changes  requiring  output  adjustments.  Fooled  by 
unexpected  monetary  growth  and  the  resulting 
economy-wide  rise  in prices,  economic  agents  treat 
the price  increases  as signifying demand  shifts special 
to  themselves  and  so  expand  production. 
Credit  for identifying  this particular  nonneutrality 
goes  to John  Stuart  Mill.  In  his  1833  article  “The 
Currency  Juggle,”  he  explained  how  unanticipated 
money  growth  had 
produced  a rise  of prices,  which  not being  supposed  to  be 
connected  with  a depreciation  of the  currency,  each  mer- 
chant  or manufacturer  considered  to  arise from  an increase 
of the  effectual  demand  for his particular  article,  and fancied 
there  was  a  ready  and  permanent  market  for  almost  any 
quantity  of that  article  which  he  could  produce  (p.  191). 
In other  words,  each  producer  had misinterpreted 
the  rise in general  prices  as a relative-price  signal to 
expand  his operations.  Here  is how monetary  expan- 
sion and the  resulting  general  inflation  may,  in Mill’s 
words,  “create  a  fat&  opinion  of an increase  of demand, 
which  false  opinion  leads,  as the  reality  would  do, 
to  an  increase  of production  .  .  .” (p.  191). 
Mill recognized  that  the confusion  between  general 
and  relative  prices  applies  equally  to  workers  who, 
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failing  to  see  that  price  rises  are  so extensive  as to 
reduce  real  wages,  supply  extra  effort  under  the 
misapprehension  that  nominal  wage  increases  con- 
stitute  real  ones.  He  explains: 
the  inducement  which  . . . excited  this  unusual  ardour  in all 
,persons  engaged  in production,  must  have  been  the  expec- 
tation  of  getting  more  commodities  generally,  more  real 
wealth,  in exchange  for the  produce  of their  labour,  and  not 
merely  more  pieces  of  paper  (1848,  p.  550). 
Mill was no believer  in long-run  nonneutrality.  He 
insisted  (1)  that  inflation’s  stimulus  is temporary  at 
best,  (2)  that  it lasts  only  “as long  as the  existence 
of depreciation  is not suspected”  or anticipated  (1844, 
p.  275),  (3) that  it ends  “when  the  delusion  vanishes 
and  the  truth  is  disclosed”  (1844,  p.  275),  and 
(4)  that  it  is “followed  .  .  . by  a  fatal  revulsion  as 
soon  as the  delusion  ceases”  (1833,  p.  19 1). In other 
words,  once  agents  correctly  perceive  wage and price 
increases  as  nominal  rather  than  real,  economic 
activity  reverts  to its steady-state  level,  but only  after 
undergoing  a temporary  recession  to correct  for the 
excesses  of the  inflationary  boom.  Here  is Mill’s con- 
clusion  that,  when  people  mistake  general  for relative 
price  increases,  nonneutrality  arises  both  at the  time 
of the  misperception  and  also when  it is corrected. 
Mill’s insistence  that  only  unperceived  or  unantici- 
pated  inflation  has  real  effects  marks  him  as a fore- 
runner  of  the  modern  new  classical  school. 
Other  Sources of Nonneutrality 
The  preceding  by  no  means  exhausts  the  list,of 
nonneutralities  considered  by  the  classicals.  Also 
analyzed  were  at  least  four  more. 
The  first relied  on Adam  Smith’s  doctrine  that  the 
division  of  labor  is  limited  by  the  extent  of  the 
market.  Attwood,  Malthus,  McCulloch,  and Torrens 
employed  this  idea.  They  argued  that  monetary  ex- 
pansion  stimulates  aggregate  spending  which 
enhances  the  scope  of the  market  for goods  and  ser- 
vices.  In  Attwood’s  words: 
the  issue  of money  wi//create  markets,  and  . . . it is upon 
the  abundance  or  scarcity  of money  that  the  extent  of  all 
markets  principally  depends  (1817b,  p.  5,  as  quoted  in 
Fetter,  1965,  p.  75). 
Similarly Torrens  claimed  that  extra  money  improves 
business .confidence  and that  “an enlargement  of con- 
fidence  always  produces  that  enlargement  of  the 
market  which  it  anticipates”  (1816,  as  quoted  in 
Robbins,  1958,  p. 82).  Extension  of the  market  then 
prompts  increased  specialization  and division of labor, 
thus  boosting  labor’s  productivity.  Through  this 
channel  monetary  expansion,  in  Torrens’s  words, 
“facilitates  exchanges,  and,  by  occasioning  more 
accurate  division  of  employment,  augments  the 
productiveness  of industry”  (18 12, p.  95,  as quoted 
in Robbins,  1958,  p.  77).  In so doing,  money  growth 
induces  a higher  level  of output  from  a given  labor 
force.6 
6 Traces  of the  division-of-labor  argument  survive  today  in the 
popular  notion  that  scale  economies  enable  firms  to respond  to 
demand-expansion  policy  by  producing  higher  levels  of output 
at  lower  unit  costs. 
Robert  Torrens 
(1780-1864) 
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nized  that  the  labor  force  itself  might  expand  under 
the  impact  of inflationary  money  growth.  He  thought 
that  rising  prices,  by  eroding  the  real  value  of fixed 
nominal  incomes,  could  force  annuitants,  rentiers, 
and  the  like  to  go  to  work  in  an  effort  to  maintain 
their  real  incomes.  Such  people,  he  said, 
finding  their  places  in  society  perpetually  sinking,  will  be 
prompted  to some  species  of exertion,  in order  to avert  the 
evil;  and  thus  the  number  of  idle  individuals,  who  add 
nothing  to the  general  stock  of society,  will be  diminished, 
and  industry  will  receive  a two-fold  stimulus, 
namely  one  arising  from  increased  division  of labor 
and  the  other  from  augmentation  of the  labor  force 
(1812,  pp.  40-41,  as  quoted  in  Robbins,  1958,  p. 
76). 
Torrens  also  acknowledged  that  money  growth 
could  stimulate  industry  if  nominal  interest  rates 
lagged  behind  inflation  so that  real rates  fell. He  said 
that  when  this happens  “all employers  of Capital  bor- 
rowed  are  likewise  benefitted-paying  less  [real] 
interest.  There  is a greater  stimulus  to  production” 
(Political  Economy  Club,  1921,  p.  219,  as  quoted 
in  Carry,  1962,  p.  58). 
Division  of labor,  expansion  of the  labor  force,  lag 
in nominal  interest  rate-these  constituted  three  of 
the  four additional  sources  of nonneutrality  identified 
by the  classicals.  Henry  Thornton  located  the  fourth 
in sellers’ efforts  to maintain  constant  real inventory- 
to-sales  ratios.  These  efforts,  which  ensured  that  any 
money-induced  rise in the  real volume  of sales would 
be  matched  by  a corresponding  rise  in  production 
for  inventory,  were  described  by  him  as  follows: 
It  may  be  said  .  . that  an  encreased  issue  of paper  tends 
to  produce  a  more  brisk  demand  for  the  existing  goods, 
and  a somewhat  more  prompt  consumption  of them;  that 
the  more  prompt  consumption  supposes  a diminution  of 
the  ordinary  stock,  and  the  application  of that  part  of  it, 
which  is  consumed,  to  the  purpose  of giving  life  to  fresh 
industry;  that  the  fresh  industry  thus  excited  will  be  the 
means  of gradually creating  additional  stock,  which  will serve 
to  replace  the  stock  by  which  the  industry  had  been  sup- 
ported;  and  that  the  new  circulating  medium  will,  in  this 
manner,  create  for  itself  much  new  employment  (1802, 
p.  237). 
All-in-all  the  classicals  left  a fairly  extensive  list  of 
factors  explaining  money’s  short-run  output  effects. 
The  Classicals’ Legacy 
The  classicals  bequeathed  their  theory  of  non- 
neutrality  to  later  generations  of  economists  who 
used  it to account  for money’s  temporary  impact  on 
real  variables.  Thus  quantity  theorists  from  Irving 
Fisher  to Milton  Friedman  introduced  Hume’s  price 
lag into  the  equation  of exchange  MV = PQ  to show 
that,  with velocity  V constant,  a change  in the  money 
stock  M produces  a temporary  change  in output  Q 
before  fully changing  prices  P.7 Keynesians  employed 
the  same  notion  to  argue  that,  with  unemployed 
resources,  prices  fail  to  rise  in  proportion  with  a 
rising nominal  money  stock.  The  resulting  rise in the 
real  money  stock,  Keynesians  claimed,  lowers  the 
rate  of  interest  and  thereby  boosts  investment 
spending  and  thus  the  level  of  national  income.* 
Other  classical  sources  of  nonneutrality  were 
quickly  absorbed  into mainstream  monetary  thought. 
Alfred  and Mary  Marshall  (1879,  pp.  155-56),  A. C. 
Pigou  (1913,  pp.  75-84),  Ralph  Hawtrey  (1913),  and 
Keynesians  in  the  194Os,  ‘5Os,  and  ’60s  used  the 
notion  of sticky  money  wages  to  explain  how  fluc- 
tuations  in prices  caused  or accommodated  by  fluc- 
tuations  in money  produce  corresponding  fluctuations 
in  real  wages  and  thus  output  and  employment. 
Irving  Fisher’  (1913,  Ch.  4)  employed  the  idea  of 
sticky  nominal  interest  rates  to explain  how  money- 
induced  price  changes  affect  investment  and  real 
activity  by changing  real rates.  This  idea formed  the 
basis  of his  (1923)  theory  of the  business  cycle  as 
“a  dance  of  the  dollar.”  Likewise  his  (1933)  debt- 
deflation  theory  of the  Great  Depression  embodied 
the  classical  idea  that  falling  prices  emanating  from 
monetary  contraction  depress  real  activity  by  rais- 
ing  the  real  burden  of  debt-service  charges. 
Additional  classical  ideas  were  put  to  work. 
Austrian  economists  Ludwig  von  Mises  (19 12) and 
Frederich  von  Hayek  (1933)  used  the  classical  doc- 
trine  of forced  saving  to  explain  the  upswing  phase 
of  their  monetary  overinvestment  theory  of  the 
cycle.  And  most  recently,  Robert  Lucas  (1972)  has 
developed  John  Stuart  Mill’s idea that  money  has real 
effects  when  general  price  changes  are  mistaken  for 
relative  price  ones.  Also  prominent  in  Lucas’s  and 
other  new  classicals’  analysis  is  the  Thornton-Mill 
argument  that  real  effects  stem  from  unanticzipated 
money.  Classical  contributions  are  thus  seen  to 
underlie  much  twentieth-century  work  on  money’s 
nonneutrality. 
These  contributions  notwithstanding,  the  myth 
persists  that  the  classicals  adhered  to  the  neutrality 
7 On  the  nonneutrality  of money  in the  writings  of Irving  Fisher, 
the  Chicago  school,  and  the  Cambridge  cash-balance  school,  see 
Patinkin  (1972). 
8 See  Patinkin  (1987,  p.  640). 
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Keynes  created  this  myth  in his  General T/rory when 
he  sought  to  differentiate  his  approach  from  those 
of his classical  and  neoclassical  predecessors.  Today 
economists  and textbook  writers  perpetuate  the  myth 
by disseminating  a caricature  “classical” macromodel 
in  which,  money  is  always  neutral.  Further  con- 
tributing  to  the  myth  is  the  tendency  of  writers 
such  as Arjo  Klamer  (1984,  p.  12)  to  interpret  the 
new  classical  macroeconomics  and  its  policy- 
ineffectiveness  idea as a return  to an original  classical 
tradition  of  neutrality-always.  All  are  wrong.  The 
classical  tradition  never  held  that  money  was  always 
neutral.  On  the  contrary,  except  for Ricardo  and  one 
or two others,  the  classicals  believed  that  money  had 
powerful  temporary  real  effects  and  perhaps  some 
residual  permanent  effects  as well.  In the  view  of the 
classicals,  nonneutrality  typified  the  short  run  and 
neutrality  at best  held  approximately  in the  long  run 
only. 
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